German Rations During Offensive Operations
By
Jim Pool
(Lt.Col., Ret.)
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Special thanks to Jim
Pool for providing the article below. Mr. Pool is a
well known collector, historian, & author with focus
on the topic of WWII German rations items . He has
contributed several articles to this site & we are
always excited when we receive a new one as they are
always full of great information and images.
If you enjoy reading this article, then we highly
recommend you pick up his new book,
Rations of the German Wehrmacht in World War II.
It is definitely a "must have" for those of us
interested in things like this.
Introduction
I was reading my copy of the book, “Deutsche Soldaten”
by Agustín Sáiz the other day and came across this
rather peculiar passage:
”Lack of
food, or worse still, hunger, was one of
the nightmare scenarios of a soldiers'
existence. The Blitzkrieg, in spite of
all its advantages in terms of warfare,
meant an ongoing serious problem for the
supply corps. Supplies had to be
transported across un-surfaced roads and
along trails, often under enemy fire and
in all kinds of weather. Of course,
ammunition that was essential for the
development of the campaign and
maintaining what could be a fluid front
was given priority. In consequence, and
more often than not, the troops suffered
alarming ration shortages until
positions were stabilized and supplies
delivered regularly. Until that time,
the men had to survive on combat
rations, more popularly as 'iron
rations' that-whenever possible-were
swapped for fresh products with the
local population.” |
I'm not positive what
the author was trying to convey, but the impression
it gave me was that the German soldier on the
offense had to sustain himself solely on a Half Iron
Ration and by foraging. That's certainly not an
accurate picture of how the German supply system
operated. The German military conducted in depth
staff work before conducting any type of operation.
Several courses of action were developed along with
the pro's and con's associated with each course.
Logistic planning was just as thorough as the
tactical planning. Rations were given equal priority
in the planning process along with ammunition, fuel
and lubricants, medical, postal etc. More often than
not in the actual execution of operations, fuel and
ammunition were given priority over rations as far
as allocating transport.
Once a course of action was decided upon, the
preparations began. In the ration arena that meant
filling unit ration requirements and stocking
depots. By the end of the war the German military
kept 20 days of rations in the field. The troop
units stocked 3 days of normal supplies and 2 days
iron rations (1 half and 1 full). Corps and Division
dumps stocked 5 days rations. The Army Depots
stocked 10 days rations and the Army Group 5 days.
Once operations began, rations were requisitioned as
needed to keep the depots and units stocked. Local
stores obtained by purchase or confiscation were not
considered when conducting combat operations.

Doctrine
As mentioned at the troop level there were 3 days of
normal rations and 2 days of iron rations on hand. I
have decided to focus the rest of this discussion on
infantry units. The reason is because the infantry
made up the great majority of the German military
and also because they were also the most difficult
to supply. Unlike their mechanized comrades the
infantryman had to carry everything with them. There
are numerous types of offensive operations each
having their own logistic challenges. I have chosen
a breakthrough scenario, pursuing an enemy against
light to moderate resistance in a air power neutral
environment. The unit commander would assess his
situation and determine the best options to keep his
troops fed. Generally once the troops started
pursuing the enemy it would be difficult for the
field kitchens to move and set up in order to
provide hot meals for the troops. In most cases the
commander would try to feed his troops before an
operation began, issue the half-iron ration as well
as cold components of the normal rations to keep the
soldiers fed until the field kitchens could get
forward and established. The question is just how
much of the normal ration should be issued? Remember
the infantryman had to carry everything with him,
food, ammunition, extra clothing, personal kit,
field gear, weapon etc. At some point weight becomes
an issue because it can impact the soldiers ability
to function. This paragraph in Merkblatt 18a/17
Taschenbuch für den Winterkreig, dated 1942
shows a deep understanding of the common
infantryman's plight: "If it is anticipated that
serving from field kitchens will not be possible,
powdered coffee, tea and other rations should be
issued in advance, to enable the soldiers to prepare
their own hot drinks and hot food. To prevent
overloading the men, however, only essential rations
should be issued. Otherwise they will throw away
whatever seems unnecessary at the moment."
The daily allowance for the
standard infantryman till the end of 1944 is shown
below. I have not encountered a standardized list of
cold components to be issued to the troops during
offensive operations. It appears that decision fell
on the unit commander or his chain of command.
700 grams of
bread: |
Fresh bread in loaves seems to be
popular. However other bread products in
cans, cartons, paper wrapping were also
options. |
173 grams of
meats, soy bean flour, cheese fish or
eggs: |
Fresh sausage or salami seemed to be
popular. However tube cheese, canned
meat or fish were also options.
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650 grams of
vegetables: |
Its possible that mixed canned
meat/vegetables were issued.
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45 grams of
pudding powder or skim milk: |
Its unlikely that pudding powder was
issued. Small aluminum cans of milk were
perfect in size and weight. |
19 grams of
spices, salt and other seasoning |
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9 grams of
coffee or tea |
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60 grams of
fat and bread spreads: |
Butter, lard, marmalades, fats and
bread spreads. |
40 grams of
sugar: |
Units were ample supplied with a wide
variety of chocolates and other sweets.
These would have been perfect for troops
on the offensive. |
Ideally the commander
would want the field kitchen to get in position to
provide a hot meal within 24 hours of a start of
operations or supply the cold components of the
normal ration to sustain the troops until that
occurred. Each soldier also carried a Half Iron
Ration for emergency use, in the event food could
not be provided within the 24 hour window. Only the
commander, platoon leader or in special
circumstances the squad leader could authorize the
Half Iron Ration to be eaten.

At the unit level
they would requisition, receive, stock, cook and
distribute rations as required. Rations would be
delivered to or picked up by the unit using
available transportation. In extreme cases the Air
Force would fly rations to forward airfields or
utilize drop canisters to get rations to forward
units. During combat operations the front line units
would generally send troops back to a predetermined
location to pick up rations for their units and take
them forward.
Results
How well did this system work in practice? Jeff
Johannes wrote an interesting article entitled
German Rations at the Front: A snap of what the
German Soldier consumed during the Battle of the
Bulge. He concluded that "the real story is that
the German Army could not even keep its own front
line combat troops adequately fed during the
campaign." I decided to examine his conclusions
utilizing a number of references on the battle to
include his primary source, The Battle of the
Bulge in Luxembourg, Volume I: The Germans. I
have restricted my research to the period 16
December to 25 December, 1944. Once the weather
cleared on 25 December Allied air power came into
play, denying the Germans any hope for victory.
At the strategic level rations
appeared to have little impact on the final outcome
of the battle. I think the following paragraph from
the book The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge by
Hugh M. Cole summarizes the food situation during
the campaign:
” The
Germans 'fueled' their horses with
greater ease than their motor vehicles.
Straw and hay were plentiful in the
area, although an order had to be put
out forbidding the use of straw as
bedding material for the troops, and
those units which came late into an area
found foraging sparse. Potatoes and
livestock were taken from the local
population in large quantities, but the
supply of bread stuff was barely
adequate, chiefly because of troubles in
transporting bulk flour to the field
bakery units. It was necessary therefore
to reduce the bread ration to all but
front-line troops.” |
Except for bread
stuffs the German ration system didn't appear to
suffer from any major shortages of food items during
the Ardennes offensive. Even the lack of bread
stuffs was not due to a shortage of flour, but
rather a lack of transportation (which impacted all
classes of supply) to carry it forward to the Field
Bakeries.
Finally I
searched through the The Battle of the Bulge in
Luxembourg, Volume I: The Germans to get the
soldiers perspective on how well the ration system
worked during the campaign. Its important to
remember that the book is not an analysis of the
German Ration system, but personal recollections of
veterans who participated in the battle.
Feldwebel Günter Münnich, I Bn. GR 914 |
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Dec. 16 - |
In the
attack |
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Dec. 21 - |
Acquired a
lot of U.S. Rations and a ham.
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Unteroffizier Wilhelm Stetter, 3rd
Co. GR 915 |
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Dec. 15 - |
At noon he
received rations and later given his
march rations consisting of bread and
honey. |
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Dec. 16 - |
In the attack. |
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Dec. 17 - |
Ate bread ration. |
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Dec. 18 - |
Shared his half iron ration with
Naval personnel who had either eaten or
thrown away their iron rations.
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Dec. 19 - |
Got mail and rations to include hot
coffee. |
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Dec. 20 - |
Found U.S. Rations and a jar of jam.
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Dec. 21 - |
Got rations to include bread.
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Dec. 24 - |
Order given to eat Iron Rations.
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Dec. 25 - |
Found food in abandoned homes.
Received a hot meal from the Field
Kitchen. |
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Friedrich Schmäschke, 3rd Co. I Bn.
GR 916
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Dec. 15 - |
Iron rations distributed and checked.
Got a hot meal. |
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Dec. 16 - |
In the attack. Captured U.S Rations.
Field Kitchen arrives that evening.
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Dec. 17 - |
Got hot meal from the Field Kitchen.
Cold rations were not distributed.
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Dec. 18 - |
Field Kitchen had moved and food was
not received till noon. He went to
stable where equipment from dead and
wounded soldiers was stored and picked
up three extra Iron Rations, bread, and
Scho-ka-kola. Between 1400-1500 he
received a hot meal. Was later wounded
and evacuated. |
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Eduard Krüger, 5th Parachute Division
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Dec. 16 - |
0530 issued Iron Rations and
breakfast. Found some potatoes and
bacon. |
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Dec. 19 - |
Hot food delivered from the Field
Kitchen, but he had so many captured
U.S. Rations that he and his comrades
passed on the issue foods. He was
captured sometime after this date.
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Ulrich Krüger, 14th Co., Parachute
Regiment 15, 5th Parachute Division
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Dec. 16 - |
Issued cold rations which included
bread, butter, sausage and soft cheese.
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Paul Engelhardt, 276th VGD
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Dec. 16 - |
In the attack. |
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Dec. 20 - |
0300 got a hot meal from the Field
Kitchen. It consisted of a casserole
with peas, beans, savory cabbage,
carrots, potatoes, turnips or red
cabbage with a lot of meat or fat. Now
and then there were also baked potatoes,
goulash or a piece of roast meat with
vegetables, fruit and salad. The food
was plentiful here, and each man
received a mess kit with 1.5 to 2 liters
of it. The cold rations were also
distributed along with the Half Ration
(The cold rations were given out when it
was anticipated that the Field Kitchen
would not be able to provide food in the
course of the following day). The cold
food consisted of Army Bread, various
spreads like butter or margarine,
sausages of various types, jelly, Ersatz
Honey, hard cheese or cheese spread,
sardines in oil, fish in tomato sauce
and Scho-ka-kola. He later mentions
receiving 3 cigarettes a day as the
daily ration, plus 10 extra a day for
being in the Front Lines. |
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Dec. 25 - |
Was issued the Front Line Assault
Ration. |

Conclusion
There were numerous other accounts in the book where
no mention of rations. Many of the above accounts
show periods of several days where nothing is said
about the ration situation. The lack of comments is
a pretty positive indication that the ration system
was functioning. Providing rations to troops
conducting offensive operations is difficult even
under the best of conditions. As a member of the
U.S. Army I remember fondly receiving the mornings
hot breakfast at midnight, if at all, and this was
during peacetime maneuvers. Throw in bad weather, a
poor road network, a lack of transport vehicles and
a determined enemy and it makes you wonder how the
German Military was able to function as well as it
did, after 5 years of almost continuous combat.

The following paragraphs in
Alex Buchner's book The German Infantry Handbook
1939-1945 captures the essence of the Germans
ration system during the war.
"The rations intended to be the
morning, midday or evening meal could,
naturally, not always be delivered at
the regular times on account of the
fighting. For this reason the field
cooks had to be movable and able to
improvise. While in times of quiet,
every soldier in the assembled company
came forward with his own utensils and
field flask to get his food, in times of
action the food was brought close to the
front. In darkness the Field Kitchen was
driven to a known, designated place, as
protected as possible, to which the
company's food gatherers (three to four
men per group) came to get warm and cold
food for the following day; one man per
group took about six full cooking pots
for his comrades, a second had the field
flasks filled with coffee or tea and
slung on himself, and a third carried
the cold food in a tent square or sack.
Such a distribution of food was not
without danger. The clearly audible
rattling of the utensils, the flashes of
flashlights and such often drew enemy
fire." |

"Naturally, there were times of
hunger and deprivation often enough,
when supply problems or critical
situations brought rations to a stop.
But no soldier starved as long as he was
with his troops (with the exception of
the Sixth army's defeat in the
Stalingrad basin). And it probably would
have been impossible for half-starved
German soldiers to have marched forward
and back for thousands of kilometers
through all of Europe in campaigns that
went on for years." |

Co mponents















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Buckner, Alex, The German Infantry
Handbook 1939-1945, Schiffer Military
History, 1991 |
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Cole, Hugh M., The Ardennes: Battle of
the Bulge, Office
of the Chief of Military History, United
States Army, Washington, D.C., 1965
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Gaul, Roland, The Battle of the Bulge
in Luxembourg, Volume I: The Germans,
Schiffer Military/Aviation History, 1995
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Johannes, Jeff, Article for Der Erste
Zug, German Rations at the Front: A snap
of what the German Soldier consumed during
the Battle of the Bulge. |
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Pool, Jim and Bock, Tom, Rations of
the German Wehrmacht in WWII, Schiffer
Military/Aviation History, 2010 |
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Sáiz, Agustín, Deutsche Soldaten, Casemate
Philadelphia and Newbury, 2008
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Merkblatt 18a/17 Taschenbuch für den
Winterkreig, dated 1942 |
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